The Feeling of Religious Longing and Passionate Rationality by Tietjen, Ruth Rebecca
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 6/3 (AUTUMN 2014), PP. 131-152
THE FEELING OF RELIGIOUS LONGING 
AND PASSIONATE RATIONALITY
RUTH REBECCA TIETJEN
University of Tübingen
Abstract. What is the feeling of religious longing and how, if at all, can religious 
longing justify religious beliefs? Starting with an  analogy between religious 
longing and basic physical needs and an analogy between religious longing and 
musical longing, I argue that the feeling of religious longing is characterized by 
four features: (1) its generality, (2) its indeterminate transcendent object which 
by its nature is not capable of empirical verification or falsification, (3) its mode 
of being infinitely interested in passion and (4) its ambiguity with regard to our 
own power and powerlessness. Religious longing can neither epistemically nor 
pragmatically justify religious beliefs. If we want to account for the rationality 
of religious beliefs motivated by religious longing, we have to consider 
passionate rationality as a third kind of rationality. We wholeheartedly take as 
true what we experience as a condition of the possibility of (an understandable, 
meaningful) life.
Apostle Paul writes in his letter to the Romans:
For I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to 
be compared with the glory that is to be revealed to us. For the anxious 
longing of the creation waits eagerly for the revealing of the sons of God. 
For the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but because of 
Him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also will be set 
free from its slavery to corruption into the freedom of the glory of 
the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groans and 
suffers the pains of childbirth together until now. And not only this, but 
also we ourselves, having the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves 
groan within ourselves, waiting eagerly for our adoption as sons, the 
redemption of our body. For in hope we have been saved, but hope that is 
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seen is not hope; for who hopes for what he already sees? But if we hope 
for what we do not see, with perseverance we wait eagerly for it. In the 
same way the Spirit also helps our weakness; for we do not know how to 
pray as we should, but the Spirit Himself intercedes for us with groanings 
too deep for words; and He who searches the hearts knows what the 
mind of the Spirit is, because He intercedes for the saints according to 
the will of God.1
In this passage, Apostle Paul describes a  state of longing in which we 
shall find ourselves; a state of anxious longing and eagerly waiting. He 
describes it as a state in which not only we as people shall find ourselves, 
but together with us the whole of creation. In the state of faith, this feeling 
of longing is at the same time a state of belief. ‘What kind of state is this 
anxious longing?’, we ask ourselves; we, who do not groan (or at most 
about our work); we, who believe ourselves not to be anxious (or at least 
not in this way) and not to hope for the kingdom of God; we, who do not 
hear the groaning of nature, but at most its indifferent silence.
The state described here is obviously a kind of feeling (understood in 
a broad sense). It is a feeling which on the one hand is directed to our 
present state, and on the other hand points beyond this present state. We 
experience our current state as painful, and, at the same time, anticipate 
the possibility of release from our pain. We experience that what we 
could be is not exhausted by what we are. This possible state of being that 
we anticipate is not a neutral possibility, but the object of our longing 
and hope, and our anticipation is not a cognitive state additional to our 
feeling, but itself part of it. The painful state in which we are is not simply 
a state in which we find ourselves through no fault of our own; it is a state 
for which we partly bear responsibility. But at the same time, and this 
is crucial for the feeling of religious longing, we experience this state as 
something from which we cannot free ourselves without help from the 
outside. What we are longing for is partly beyond our own power, so our 
feeling of longing is at the same time a  feeling of being dependent on 
something other than ourselves.
For an  illustration of this phenomenon, consider the mundane 
example of experiencing oneself as falling short of one’s own potential. 
I often sit at my desk and want to work, but am unable to concentrate. 
When this state lasts the whole day, I  feel frustrated in the evening 
because I  have not achieved what I  wanted to achieve, should have 
1 New American Standard Bible, Rom. 8:18–27.
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achieved and, most importantly, could have achieved. But what was the 
reason for my failure? It was my lack of concentration. I blame myself for 
it. ‘If only I had concentrated’, I think. At the same time I know that my 
ability to concentrate on my work is not completely in my own hands. 
Of course, I can go to sleep early, exercise and keep distractions out of 
my way. But this does not give me a  guarantee. So, I  can do nothing 
further than adjust the conditions of my work in a  manner which is 
likely to enable my concentration, and, in addition to this, hope for the 
next day. If my hope is fulfilled and I even get into a flow of work, I feel 
much better in the evening due to what I achieved that day. But still, this 
feeling is accompanied by a  vague sense of gratitude for the fact that 
my thinking went better that day. In other words, I have the experience 
that the conditions of my own mental productivity, the exhaustion of my 
intellectual potential, do not entirely lie in my own hands.
Let us now return to the religious sphere, in which infinitely more is 
at stake than our professional success or our philosophical productivity. 
As a  preliminary result, we can conclude that the state of religious 
longing described by Paul points us toward a  potential which lies in 
ourselves as well as in the Creation, but is not exhausted. We experience 
the exhaustion of this potential as something which lies partly within 
and partly beyond our own power.2
Paul describes the state of longing from the perspective of someone 
who is already in the state of faith. In the state of faith, our longing is not 
merely longing, but at the same time confidence. The believer dares to 
believe that what he is longing for is or will become real. But the feeling 
of religious longing can also be the starting point of faith. In this case, our 
longing is transformed into the belief that what we are longing for will 
be, and to some extent already is, real. This, at first sight, is an outrageous 
idea: to believe certain facts to be true, because one desires these facts 
to be true, is wishful thinking, and therefore, according to common 
opinion, the epitome of irrationality. According to this common point of 
view, the desire present in the feeling of religious longing might indeed 
be capable of motivating, but never of justifying religious belief.
The aim of my essay is to vindicate the transition from religious 
longing to religious belief as an  instance of ‘passionate rationality’. 
2 Interestingly, not only the fulfilment of our longing but also our experience of 
longing itself may be regarded as an ambiguous phenomenon. It is partly responsive and 
we are partly responsible for it.
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For  this purpose, we should first characterize the feeling of religious 
longing. In the first paragraph I approach the feeling of religious longing 
via two analogies. This approach is founded on the fact that I – contrary 
to Paul – do not only focus on religious longing felt by people who are 
not (yet) in a state of faith, but also explore it from the perspective of 
someone who does not know the feeling (or at least believes herself 
not to know it) from her own experience. The first analogy compares 
religious longing with a physical need. It is prominently developed by 
Søren A. Kierkegaard and has recently been employed by Robert C. 
Roberts. The second analogy compares religious longing with the feeling 
of musical longing. In the current debate, Mark Wynn makes use of this 
analogy. In the second paragraph, I abstract a general characterization of 
the phenomenon of religious longing from these two analogies. I thereby 
assume the plausibility of the two analogies. Out of this characterization 
I  extract the concept of religious feeling which must be assumed if 
religious longing is to be understood as a religious feeling, that is, firstly, 
as a  feeling and, secondly, as religious. I  thereby take for granted that 
religious longing is to be understood as a religious feeling. Based on this 
analysis, I finally turn to the transition from religious longing to religious 
belief. I argue that the contemporary debate about the justifying force 
of emotions does not help us to vindicate the epistemic or pragmatic 
rationality of this transition. But the phenomenon of religious belief 
motivated by religious longing opens up a new perspective on the role of 
feelings in the context of rationality. This perspective is captured in the 
concept of passionate rationality.
I. TWO ANALOGIES
What is religious longing felt by someone who is not (yet) in a state of 
faith and therefore does not have religious beliefs? We start with two 
analogies:
First analogy: Our religious longing is comparable to a  basic physical 
need. A  basic physical need is a  need whose fulfilment is crucial for 
our physical well-being and flourishing. The concept of a  basic need 
is therefore a  genuine normative concept. According to the analogy, 
the relationship with God is a spiritual need, which manifests itself in 
spiritual illness if it remains unfulfilled, in the same way as unfulfilled 
physical needs express themselves in physical illness. This analogy is 
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prominently developed by Søren A. Kierkegaard in ‘The Sickness Unto 
Death’, published under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus.3 According to 
Anti-Climacus, the sickness unto death is the spiritual illness which 
occurs if a person lacks a relationship (or the right kind of relationship) 
with God, if his relationship with God and therefore with himself, or 
conversely, his relationship with himself and therefore with God, is 
disturbed. Just like physical illness, mental illness occurs in degrees, 
depending on the degree to which our need is unfulfilled. At one end 
of the scale is death. The spiritual illness is a  sickness unto death not 
because it finally leads to physical death, but because it leads to spiritual 
death, a death we suffer while alive and which for precisely that reason 
is so painful. The sickness unto death is despair and this is, in its most 
extreme variant, hopelessness. We lack any hope for salvation, so we feel 
something like an unsatisfiable desire; we feel that what we long for will, 
and must, remain forever out of our reach; we feel that there indeed is 
nothing more than our painful current state. Or perhaps we should rather 
say it is the state in which even our feeling of longing has become silent. 
At the other end of the scale is faith. As faith is not merely a state, but 
also an act, we cannot simply rest in a state of faith, but have to perform 
it. Just like faith, despair has a responsive as well as an active dimension.
Anti-Climacus’ approach consists of three steps: the starting point 
is a description of the phenomenon of despair. In the second step, this 
phenomenon of despair is interpreted as a deficiency. In the last step, the 
conditions of mental health are extracted from this deficiency. Michael 
Theunissen has coined the concept of methodological negativism for this 
approach: the starting point is not an assumed normative standard of 
spiritual health, on the basis of which sickness is judged as an anomaly. 
On the contrary, the conditions of spiritual flourishing are inferred ex 
negativo from its failure.4 In particular, faith is defined ‘only through the 
analysis of its negation’.5
An analogous three-step development translated into practical terms 
can be found in the lives of those who encounter religious faith through 
the feeling of religious longing. William James describes developments 
of this kind in his lectures ‘The Diversity of Religious Experience’. He 
gives a prominent role to Leo Tolstoy, who describes his own spiritual 
3 See Kierkegaard (1980).
4 See Theunissen (1981: 487).
5 Theunissen (1981: 489).
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development in his autobiographical report ‘A  Confession’.6 Tolstoy 
grew up in an Orthodox Christian home and environment, but apostasy 
from faith took place quickly. The pursuit of physical, mental and moral 
perfection is replaced by the pursuit of becoming richer, more famous 
and more important than others. He succeeds in achieving these aims 
and lives a successful life as an author. Like his colleagues, he believes in 
progress and, above all, in contributing to this progress by being a writer 
and therefore a  teacher of mankind. But he becomes more and more 
aware that he himself does not know what to teach and which kind of 
life to live. The moments of doubt become more and more frequent and 
culminate in a serious crisis of life:
At first I experienced moments of perplexity and arrest of life, as though 
I  did not know what to do or how to live; and I  felt lost and became 
dejected. But this passed and I  went on living as before. Then these 
moments of perplexity began to recur oftener and oftener, and always in 
the same form. They were always expressed by the questions: What is it 
for? What does it lead to?7
This is the first step: the despair has a  purely negative character. It 
expresses itself in the feeling of senselessness, and maybe also in the 
feelings of anxiety, nausea or boredom. In the second step, a feeling of 
religious longing emerges, a search for something, a vague hope for help:
During that whole year, when I was asking myself almost every moment 
whether I should not end matters with a noose or a bullet – all that time, 
together with the course of thought and observation about which I have 
spoken, my heart was oppressed with a painful feeling, which I can only 
describe as a search for God.
I say that that search for God was not reasoning, but a feeling, because 
that search proceeded not from the course of my thoughts – it was even 
directly contrary to them – but proceeded from the heart. It was a feeling 
of fear, orphanage, isolation in a strange land, and a hope of help from 
someone.8
In the more advanced form of this stage, Tolstoy’s suffering is interrupted 
by brief moments of joy, in which he dares to believe and trust in God. 
In the next moment, however, he calls into question his own confidence, 
6 See James (2002), esp. lectures VI–VIII, Tolstoy (1940).
7 Tolstoy (1940: 15).
8 Tolstoy (1940: 62).
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destroys it through his reason and again is gripped by despair. Not until 
the third step is the final transition or leap from the feeling of longing to 
the state of religious faith performed:
But then I turned my gaze upon myself, on what went on within me, and 
I remembered all those cessations of life and reanimations that recurred 
within me hundreds of times. I  remembered that I only lived at those 
times when I believed in God. As it was before, so it was now; I need 
only be aware of God to live; I need only forget Him, or disbelieve Him, 
and I died.
What is this animation and dying? I  do not live when I  lose belief in 
the existence of God. I should long ago have killed myself had I not had 
a dim hope of finding Him. I live, really live, only when I feel Him and 
seek Him. ‘What more do you seek?’ exclaimed a voice within me. ‘This 
is He. He is that without which one cannot live. To know God and to live 
is one and the same thing. God is life.’
‘Live seeking God, and then you will not live without God.’ And more 
than ever before, all within me and around me lit up, and the light did 
not again abandon me.9
Second analogy: our religious longing is analogous to our musical 
longing for the harmonious resolution of a chord. We hear a dominant 
seventh chord and expect its resolution in the tonic; we hear a sequence 
of chords and expect that this sequence will be resolved harmoniously; 
we feel the rise of tension and expect that this tension will be dissolved. 
This ‘expectation’ is not a  cognitive state, which is added on to our 
perception of the chord, or of the sequence of chords or of the tension. 
Rather, we already transcend the tension in the moment of perception. 
The ‘anxious longing of the creature’ about which Paul speaks or the ‘veil 
of melancholy’ which according to Schelling ‘is spread over the whole of 
nature’10 can therefore be compared to a musical tension which is waiting 
for its resolution. Just as the state of musical tension points at a state of 
musical resolution, our feeling of religious longing points at a  state of 
resolution of this longing.
9 Tolstoy (1940: 64f.).
10 Schelling (2001: 399).
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II. THE FEELING OF RELIGIOUS LONGING
Which picture of religious longing emerges out of these two analogies? 
Which conception of religious feelings has to be assumed if religious 
longing is to be understood as a religious feeling, thus, firstly, as a feeling 
and, secondly, as religious? In the following, I  abstract five features 
of religious longing from the two analogies introduced in the first 
paragraph. I hereby take the plausibility of the two analogies for granted. 
I neither aim at overruling all possible objections to the analogies, nor 
at defending against the alternative strategy of abandoning the analogies 
altogether.
First: different people may need different amounts of food, and there 
may be differences in the length of time before hunger asserts itself if 
one does not get any food. However, at some point, a feeling of hunger 
emerges. In the course of time, this feeling becomes more and more 
intense and gnawing and finally affects our physical and mental abilities. 
In the case of the alleged need for a relationship with God, things seem 
to be different: there are people who neither understand themselves as 
believers nor as unhappy. Their basic need for a relationship with God 
does not seem to be satisfied, but still they do not feel any religious 
longing. How can we account for this phenomenon, if we want to adhere 
to the idea that religious longing is the expression of a basic human need?
If we take the need for food as our paradigm, basic needs seem to have 
two characteristics: firstly, if a basic need is unfulfilled, it expresses itself 
as a feeling which is specific to the need in question. Secondly, the person 
having the feeling is conscious of his own feeling. The first strategy to take 
account of the described phenomenon is to give up the first condition. 
The lack of a relationship with God therefore does not necessarily express 
itself in a feeling. The absence of the feeling corresponding to the need 
is interpreted as a sign of spiritual immaturity.11 This case is comparable 
to the lack of sexual desire in children, which is regarded as a  sign of 
their physical immaturity. We can also compare the lack of a feeling of 
religious longing to the case of someone who does not feel a need for 
education because he grew up in circumstances which did not allow him 
to develop such a need. So, though at first it seems one should give up 
the claim that something is a basic need rather than alleging this need 
despite many people not being aware of having such a need, on a second 
look adherents of a  basic need theory of religious longing can in fact 
11 Cf. Roberts (2007: 36).
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refer to various other cases in which we proceed analogously without 
raising concerns of an analogous kind.
The second strategy consists in giving up the second condition. 
According to this approach, religious longing is a  feeling which the 
person who feels it is not necessarily conscious of. This may mean either 
that the one who feels it is not reflectively conscious of his own feeling 
or that he is mistaken about the nature or content of his feeling.12 In 
both cases we usually take it to be necessary, first, that we can at least 
potentially become reflectively conscious of our own feeling, and second, 
that from the external perspective we cannot only give good reasons for 
assuming the presence of the feeling but also for the lack of (reflective) 
consciousness of it. Roberts pursues a  mixed strategy. On the one 
hand, he argues that ‘the natural need for God may be contingent on 
maturation’.13 On the other hand he states that not ‘each of us can, upon 
consulting the contents of our minds, find in ourselves a desire to praise 
God, or an emotion of despair that is obviously a frustrated state of our 
God-libido. Even if we are aware of wanting something that is not among 
the objects of our finite life, we may not know that we want God’.14 Both 
strategies adhere to the view that a basic need is a need whose fulfilment 
is crucial for our flourishing.
The feeling of musical longing is also a feeling which people experience 
in various degrees. The degree to which we feel musical longing depends, 
among other factors, on our musical socialization, that is, our familiarity 
with the specific piece of music as well as with the particular musical 
tradition, and on our musical aptitudes. Just as there are unmusical people, 
the lack of religious longing and therefore of other religious feelings 
might be an expression of ‘religious unmusicality’. This expression goes 
back to a letter of Max Weber’s, who characterizes himself as ‘absolutely 
unmusical in religious matters’.15 He states that he neither has ‘the need 
nor the ability to erect any religious edifies’ in himself and characterizes 
his own lack of religious musicality as a form of ‘crippledness’. Religious 
12 For the distinction between reflective and unreflective consciousness, cf. Goldie 
(2000: 62ff.).
13 Roberts (2007: 36).
14 Roberts (2007: 35f.).
15 Weber (1994:  65). The concept of religious unmusicality has been prominently 
picked up by Jürgen Habermas in his speech ‘Faith and Knowledge’. Cf. Habermas 
(2001: 30). The idea is already expressed by Schleiermacher in his speeches ‘On Religion’. 
Cf. Schleiermacher (2001: 134).
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musicality is therefore not simply described as an ability that one can 
have or lack, but as an ability which is part of human nature. Though 
we can conceive of a  translation of the feeling of musical tension into 
the purely theoretical terms of music theory, we have the intuition that 
in this process of translation something important would be lost. This 
intuition is captured by contemporary emotion theories which hold 
emotions to be an indispensable way of understanding.16
Thus, the absence of a  conscious feeling of religious longing does 
not necessarily indicate that the need for a  relationship with God is 
not a basic need. It can also be interpreted as an expression of spiritual 
immaturity or as a sign of a lack or failure of reflective consciousness of 
one’s own feeling.
Second: religious longing was introduced as a  state in which we 
experience our present state as painful. But the analogy to musical 
longing suggests that the feeling of longing can also be enjoyed. Good 
music does not simply instantly fulfil all our longings, but rather plays 
with them.17 Other kinds of longing have similar characteristics, for 
example the feeling of being in love with someone. This feeling also 
involves an experience of both tension and longing for fulfilment. You 
feel this incredible attraction between yourself and someone else. When 
you look at each other your eyes rest on each other for just one moment 
too long. If they do not, it is not because the tension vanished, but 
because you resist your longing. Touches which in other contexts would 
be experienced as random or merely friendly create a  tension which 
almost threatens to tear you apart. Although the feeling of tension in 
this case is also experienced as something aiming at resolution, it is not 
simply experienced as something to be overcome, but itself as something 
we take pleasure in. Exactly herein consists the attraction of prolonging 
the state of being in love as we do in the game of flirting. We can change 
between approach and withdrawal so often that the feeling of tension 
becomes nearly unbearable. This is only possible if the difference and 
distance between oneself and the other is maintained.
So, is it possible to analogously enjoy one’s religious longing? In his 
pseudonymous work ‘Either/Or’, Kierkegaard describes exactly this 
phenomenon. The pleasure the aesthete A  takes in his own despair is 
expressed in his aphorisms:
16 E.g. cf. Goldie (2000: 59–62, 72–83); Wynn (2005: 98–102).
17 See Madell (1996: 75).
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In addition to my other numerous acquaintances, I  have one more 
intimate confidant – my depression. In the midst of my joy, in the midst 
of my work, he beckons to me, calls me aside, even though physically 
I remain on the spot. My depression is the most trustful mistress I have 
known – no wonder, then, that I return the love.
I say of my sorrow what the Englishman says of his house: My sorrow 
is my castle. Many people look upon having sorrow as one of life’s 
conveniences.18
Thus, the aesthete A takes pleasure in his own desperate existence and 
Johannes, the seducer, exhausts the pleasure of erotic tension by not 
primarily enjoying the fulfilment of his longing, but rather the possibility 
of its fulfilment and his own aesthetic play with this possibility.
Taking the plausibility of the analogies as a given, our analysis therefore 
leads to a second result: the painful state of religious longing can at least 
partly be experienced as pleasurable. We therefore have to admit that we 
cannot only be mistaken about our own state and its specific content, but 
also about its quality. At the same time it is important to be aware that 
taking pleasure in one’s own longing always means maintaining a gap 
between oneself and one’s longing.
Third: the feeling of religious longing has been described as a 
feeling that both represents the current state as deficient and points 
to our deliverance from suffering. So religious longing seems to be 
an intentional feeling. Currently, theories of emotions are a prominent 
kind of intentionality-focussed theories of feelings. In these theories, 
emotions are taken to be affective states which are directed towards 
a particular object. The emotion represents this object in a certain way. 
Either the intentional mode or the intentional content of the emotion 
is taken to involve an  emotion-specific evaluation. Variants of these 
theories include judgement theories, perceptual theories and attitudinal 
theories of emotions. But religious longing is directed neither towards 
a particular object within the world, nor beyond the world. Rather, we 
feel that something is wrong with the life we are living or the world in 
which we find ourselves. What is wrong is not simply that this or that 
desire we have is unfulfilled. Something is wrong with our life in general, 
with our understanding and our project of life. So, what we learn is that 
what we usually take for granted – our conception of life and our basic 
interests, concerns, and ideas about what is valuable and worth striving 
18 Kierkegaard (1987: 20, 21).
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for – is not right and cannot satisfy us. The generality of the object of 
religious longing is also mirrored by the fact that religious longing 
can grip us anywhere and anytime. Though certain circumstances like 
a  deadly disease or the death of a  loved one can stimulate the feeling 
of religious longing, it is not tied to any particular situation, because it 
concerns the way we find ourselves in the world.
Analogously, the object of religious longing is indeterminate. We 
are longing for something but this something does not have a specific 
content. So, the feeling of religious longing is more like hearing the 
Tristan chord than hearing a dominant seventh chord: we feel that but 
not how the Tristan chord is to be resolved. We feel repulsed by our 
current being and at the same time attracted by what there might be 
beyond this current being. Religious longing is characterized by the fact 
that it cannot be fulfilled within our finite life. What we are longing for is 
something that transcends ourselves and the sensual world; we long for 
taking part in this something and for having a relationship with it. Thus, 
the object of our longing is, in the first place, determined in a  purely 
negative manner; it is a ‘border concept’.
Philosophical as well as religious traditions give us important 
insights into how we can specify the content of religious longing. We 
can distinguish between the quest for an ultimate explanation and the 
quest for an ultimate good. Both of these questions are questions which, 
according to Kant, human reason ‘cannot decline, as they are presented 
by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every 
faculty of the mind’.19 Kant calls these questions ‘needs of reason’ and 
therefore places them in the domain of reason, though, remarkably, 
at the same time he classifies them as needs. Furthermore, we can 
distinguish between monotheistic and pantheistic traditions, which give 
the transcendent the shape of a counterpart (God) or of an encompassing 
structure (the Divine), respectively. The transcendent is the placeholder 
which guarantees what we are longing for. The Christian God, for 
example, answers our quest for an ultimate explanation as well as our 
quest for an ultimate good. Roberts, who argues from the point of view 
of Christian tradition, further characterizes our religious longing by 
naming three aspects it involves: the need for something completely 
trustworthy, the need to be loved unconditionally and the need for 
an absolute meaning.20
19 Kant (1987: A VII).
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We can conclude that religious longing is an intentional feeling 
not directed towards a particular object, but towards the way we find 
ourselves in the world. What we are longing for is something beyond the 
reach of our senses as well as of our reason. It is something transcendent 
whose form and content in the first place remains undetermined. 
Actually, says Paul, we know not what we should pray for, and we do not 
know how to pray. But he who searches the heart knows what the mind 
of the spirit is directed to.
Fourth: the comparison of religious longing with a basic need suggests 
that religious longing is a striving rather than an emotion. Accordingly, 
Roberts does not conceptualize religious longing as an emotion, but as 
a passion. Emotions are, according to him, concern-based construals.21 
Religious longing is not a  construal, but a  concern of a  specific kind, 
a passion:
A passion is a concern that can give a person’s life a center, can integrate 
and focus the personality and give a person ‘character’. A passion then 
is a kind of concern, but not every concern is a passion. [...] I use it [the 
word ‘passion’] to refer neither to emotions nor to a general spiritedness 
of personality, but to a  person’s long-term, characteristic interests, 
concerns and preoccupations. [...] A passion in this sense is a concern 
that defines one’s psychological identity.22
Likewise, Madell characterizes the feeling of musical longing as a desire:
As I  have already claimed, music expresses emotion when it evokes 
emotion in such a way that the listener comes to identify with the course 
of the music, hears it from the inside, or has a first-person perspective 
on it. What leads to identification is the evocation of certain desires: the 
desire for the resolution of the discord, for example, or the desire that 
the pleasurable experience occasioned by its resolution may continue.23
20 See Roberts (2007: 37).
21 See Roberts (2003).
22 Roberts (2007:  17). Cf. Tillich (1957:  1): ‘Faith is the state of being ultimately 
concerned: the dynamics of faith are the dynamics of man’s ultimate concern. Man, 
like every living being, is concerned about many things, above all about those which 
condition his very existence, such as food and shelter. But man, in contrast to other living 
beings, has spiritual concerns – cognitive, aesthetic, social, political. Some of them are 
urgent, often extremely urgent, and each of them as well as the vital concerns can claim 
ultimacy for a human life or the life of a social group. If it claims ultimacy it demands the 
total surrender of him who accepts this claim, and it promises total fulfilment even if all 
other claims have to be subjected to it or rejected in its name.’
23 See Madell (1996: 75).
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Thus, the feeling of religious longing is a  state tending away from 
something and at the same time tending towards something else.
Fifth: Roberts and Madell do not just elaborate a theory of longing, 
but also specify the relation between the feeling of longing and other 
kinds of feelings: Roberts characterizes concerns as dispositions to 
a variety of emotions, and argues that having a concern of a specific kind 
is necessary for experiencing religious emotions.24 Madell distinguishes 
an  internal and an  external perspective on music: the internal 
perspective presupposes an  interest in the development of the music; 
the external perspective lacks such an interest. Only emotions based on 
an internal perspective on music are genuine musical emotions.25 What 
qualifies emotions as musical is their reference to a  musical interest, 
their dependency on the feeling of musical longing. Genuine musical 
emotions have to be distinguished from emotions which are elicited by 
music, but are based on an  external perspective on it. An  example of 
an emotion of this kind is boredom which is evoked by a piece of music, 
but does not represent a musical quality. At the same time, it is at least 
theoretically conceivable to feel genuine musical boredom, for example, 
if a piece of music always meets our musical expectations immediately. 
The classification of a phenomenon of boredom as an instance of musical 
boredom is not to be confused with classifying it as purely musical 
boredom, and therefore not real boredom.26 Rather, by labelling the 
feeling as a musical feeling we specify the particular domain to which 
the interest which is crucial for our emotion belongs.
Applying this to religious feelings entails that religious longing is 
a precondition of having religious emotions. These emotions represent 
whether and how our longing is fulfilled. If we take the plausibility of the 
analogy to musical feelings as a given, we can, furthermore, conclude 
that the dependency on religious longing (or another kind of religious 
concern) is what qualifies an emotion as religious.
The phenomenon of religious longing thus offers five challenges to 
a philosophical theory of feelings: firstly, the possibility of feelings that 
are not recognized as such by the person who feels them; secondly, the 
possibility of negative feelings which are at least partly experienced as 
pleasurable; thirdly the possibility of feelings which are not directed 
24 See Roberts (2007: 12).
25 See Madell (1996: 73).
26 See Madell (1996: 81).
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towards individual objects, but towards our being in the world as a whole; 
fourthly, the possibility of feelings that partly represent our current state 
as being in a certain way, but at the same time involve a kind of striving 
pointing beyond this current state; and fifthly, the possibility of feelings 
being necessary conditions of other kinds of feelings.
But in virtue of what is religious longing itself classified as religious? 
It is classified as religious in virtue of what it is about, what it is directed 
at and how it is. Musical longing is an interest we may or may not take in 
the course of music. The same is true for being in love with a particular 
person. On the contrary, religious longing is not an interest we can have 
or lack. What our longing is about is the good life. Being concerned with 
the good life is part of what makes us what we are. Musical and sexual 
longing are kinds of longing which can be fulfilled within our finite 
world. We can specify the conditions under which our longing would 
be fulfilled and determine the extent to which these conditions are 
already met. Religious longing, in contrast, is a  longing for something 
that transcends the sensual world. Its content is specified in a  purely 
negative manner. There are no evidential criteria for the fulfilment of 
our longing. Musical and sexual longing are finite kinds of longing: we 
take an interest in the object of our longing, but if our longing remains 
unfulfilled, life still seems possible to us. In contrast, religious longing 
consists in being infinitely interested in passion. If it remains unfulfilled, 
it is not simply the case that a special interest of ours remains unsatisfied. 
What is at stake is not simply the meaning of life or explanation of the 
world, but the very possibility of meaning and explanation altogether. As 
I argued above, what we are longing for is characterized by partly being 
within and partly beyond our own power.
III. THE TRANSITION FROM RELIGIOUS LONGING 
TO RELIGIOUS BELIEF
What is the relation between the transition from religious longing to 
religious belief and (theories of) rationality?
First of all, it is important to note that the transition from religious 
longing to religious belief cannot be justified by reference to a cognitive 
theory of religious longing. ‘Cognitive’ is here to be understood in the 
broad sense. A  cognitive state of mind has a  representational content 
and therefore is subject to conditions of appropriateness, of correctness 
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or even of truth. In his book ‘Emotional Experience and Religious 
Understanding’, Mark Wynn applies several theoretical approaches 
to the modern philosophy of emotion to the field of religion. He aims 
at vindicating what he calls a  ‘soft rationalism’ of religious belief.27 
Soft rationalism is a  position which, according to Wynn, differs from 
‘fideism’ by giving relevance to evidence and argument, and from 
‘hard rationalism’ by taking into account the possibility that affective 
experiences might also bear cognitive significance. The ‘personal, 
affectively toned experiences’ Wynn focuses on in his defence of soft 
rationalism are emotions, and thus evaluative representational states of 
mind. One of the approaches Wynn tries to apply is Madell’s theory of 
musical emotions. He introduces Madell as a representative of a theory 
of feeling which takes feelings to be ‘themselves kinds of thought or 
understanding’.28 This is surprising, as Wynn refers to a quote of Madell 
in which he explicitly classifies the feeling of religious longing as a desire:
hearing the dominant seventh evokes a desire, and sometimes something 
akin to a longing, for its resolution. That is a state of consciousness directed 
to an intentional object; it is also an affective state of consciousness. It is 
not an entertaining of an evaluation which (magically) leads to certain 
bodily disturbances. One may, if one is so disposed, regard the desire for 
the tonic resolution as ground for the evaluation that such a resolution 
would be ‘a good thing’, but it would be a total distortion to suppose that 
the desire, or the longing, is an evaluation, one which inexplicably leads 
to certain physical effects. It is a mode of ‘feeling towards’ its intentional 
object.29
Madell here criticizes an add-on theory of longing which conceptualizes 
musical longing as an evaluation plus an affective reaction caused by this 
evaluation. But his alternative account does not consist in taking musical 
longing to be an affective state which represents something, but in taking 
it to be an affective state which tends towards something.30 It is misleading 
27 Wynn (2005: ix).
28 Wynn (2005: 90).
29 Madell (1996: 78). Cf. also p. 72: ‘I have described our experience as the arousal of 
tension and a desire for relaxation, for its resolution on the tonic chord. What is evoked 
is a state of consciousness which is not merely one of affect, but which is also intentional: 
a desire, affective in itself, for a specific object.’
30 Madell takes the concept of ‘feeling towards’ from a paper of D.W. Hamlyn’s about 
‘The Phenomena of Love and Hate’, published in 1978. It differs significantly from 
Goldie’s concept of ‘feeling towards’. Cf. Goldie (2000: 19).
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of him to refer to musical longing as well as to musical joy, triumph, 
disappointment and sadness as emotions.31 We should differentiate 
between the musical longing for harmonious resolution and emotions 
which have a  representational content which is relative to the feeling 
of musical longing. According to Madell the musical emotions of joy 
and triumph mirror the fulfilment of our longing, whereas the emotions 
of disappointment and sadness mirror the lack of fulfilment. These 
emotions are felt only by someone who takes an internal perspective on 
music. This internal perspective is characterized by taking an interest in 
the development of the music and the harmonious resolution of musical 
tensions. Madell leaves it open whether this feeling of longing should 
itself be understood in cognitive terms.
Wynn claims that ‘in the case of musical appreciation, feeling is able 
to take us beyond a certain sensory input so as to pick out a reality that 
has yet to be fully revealed in sensory terms; and analogously, in the case 
of God, feeling is able to take us beyond a certain doxastic input, so as to 
relate us to a reality that has yet to be fully understood in doxastic terms’.32 
But even if one concedes that religious longing is a  cognitive state, it 
cannot justify religious beliefs – at least not those religious beliefs we are 
interested in: even if religious longing is appropriate in the sense that 
the current state is indeed painful and that what one longs for is indeed 
valuable, this does not justify the transition from religious longing to the 
religious belief that what one longs for is or will become real. Someone 
who anticipates the resolution of a dominant seventh chord into the tonic 
might be justified in perceiving the dominant seventh chord as a state of 
tension and in anticipating its resolution into the tonic as a harmonious 
and therefore valuable course for the music to take – but this does not 
justify his belief that such a resolution actually will take place. So what 
is misleading in Wynn’s statement is his talk about ‘reality’. In the state 
of longing we do not feel what is or will become real, but what should be 
or should become real. The dictum that the heart, which tends towards 
something, sometimes leads us better than reason, which represents 
something, is at the same time provocative and interesting for exactly the 
reason that feeling is not just another representational faculty.
But why exactly is the transition from religious longing to religious 
belief provocative? It is provocative because it is an instance of wishful 
31 Cf. Madell (1996: 73).
32 Wynn (2005: 146).
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thinking. Wishful thinking consists in believing a fact to be true because 
one desires it to be true. The transition from religious longing to religious 
faith is an  act which we are responsible for, not a  mere event that 
happens to us. However, it seems to be questionable whether it is at all 
conceptually possible – and if so, whether it is psychologically possible – 
to believe something because one wishes it to be true. According to 
common opinion, believing is a  receptive capacity which we can at 
most influence indirectly. At this point a  conceptual specification of 
the concept of religious belief will be helpful: religious belief consists in 
taking a proposition to be true, not in holding it to be true.33 Holding 
a proposition to be true is a mental state; taking a proposition to be true 
is a mental act which consists in taking a proposition as a true premise in 
one’s (practical) reasoning. Thus, the basic provocation of religious belief 
more precisely consists in the decision to take to be true a proposition 
which one desires to be true, though one knows that one is not justified 
in doing so by one’s total available evidence.34 If one assumes that taking 
a  proposition to be true comes in degrees, the believer fully commits 
himself to take the proposition to be true. He wholeheartedly chooses to 
live under the idea of God or the Divine.
While it seems to be questionable whether we can ever be pragmatically 
justified in holding a proposition to be true, pragmatic justifications for 
taking something to be true seem to be less problematic. Therefore, at first 
sight it seems to be possible that the decision to take to be true what one 
longs to be true should be pragmatically justified. Pragmatic justifications 
are justifications for taking (or holding) something to be true, rather than 
for taking (or holding) something to be true.35 They rely on a value which 
is either inherent in the attitude itself or is realized by it (or is likely to 
be). Tolstoy states that his decision to live under the idea of God despite 
his knowledge that he is not epistemically justified in so doing brings 
the gruelling fluctuation between confidence and desperation to an end. 
33 For this distinction cf. Bishop (2007: 33–35).
34 Bishop argues from the perspective of a  ‘reflective believer’ who questions the 
admissibility of his religious beliefs. He vindicates the stronger claim that under certain 
circumstances it is admissible to take and hold a proposition to be true though one knows 
that its truth is not supported by one’s total available evidence. Cf. Bishop (2007: 5f.).
35 The distinctions between taking and holding something to be true and between 
epistemic and pragmatic justifications are two different distinctions: taking and holding 
something to be true are attitudes towards propositions; epistemic and pragmatic 
justification deal with the legitimacy of having a  certain attitude of belief towards 
a proposition.
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He feels better because he believes in God. The pragmatic justification 
may also depend on the truth of what one believes. This for example is 
the case if the ‘reward’ is handed out by God himself or allotted only after 
death. Pascal famously argues that we should believe in God because the 
infinite reward we will gain if God exists outweighs the possible losses 
and gains of any other option we have.
Tolstoy’s and Pascal’s arguments are contestable. It is, for example, 
contentious whether Pascal’s premises are valid and whether Tolstoy’s 
decision ultimately ends his longing and suffering. As I have argued, the 
feeling of religious longing continues in the state of faith in a modified 
form. One can question whether pragmatic considerations can in the case 
in question – or indeed, ever – justify one in taking something to be true 
despite the lack of sufficient evidence. But the crucial point is another: 
the phenomenon we are dealing with, the transition from religious 
longing to religious belief, is not motivated by pragmatic considerations 
of the kind described. One does not decide to believe because oneself, or 
someone or something else, will be better off if one does so. Tolstoy says, 
‘I need only be aware of God to live; I need only forget Him, or disbelieve 
Him, and I died.’ Tolstoy’s interest expressed in the feeling of religious 
longing is existential, or, as James says, ‘momentous’.36 Tolstoy decides to 
believe because otherwise life does not seem possible to him. Thus, the 
choice does not present itself as a choice between a better and a worse 
outcome, but as a choice between the possibility and the impossibility 
of life. Above, I  referred to specifications of the phenomenon of 
religious longing which interpret it as a longing for both meaning and 
understanding. Assuming that this is so, we can specify that what is at 
stake in the choice is the meaningfulness and understandability of life as 
such, that is the possibility of meaning and understanding.
The argument now resembles a  transcendental, rather than 
a pragmatic argument. What is at stake is not the realisation of a value, 
but the condition of possibility of a  value. Transcendental arguments 
take a phenomenon as a given and identify the conditions which have 
to be met for that phenomenon to be possible. In the case at hand, the 
transcendent reality appears to be a condition of the possibility for life, 
meaning and understanding. We decide to live under the idea of God 
or the Divine, because otherwise no good life seems possible to  us. 
Ordinary transcendental arguments are considerations of ‘pure reason’. 
36 James (1896: 329).
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In contrast, the transition from religious longing to religious belief is 
a passionate movement: in the feeling of religious longing one experiences 
that no life is possible in the finite world. This experience motivates 
the decision to believe in a  transcendent reality. This decision itself is 
performed passionately. One wholeheartedly commits oneself to belief 
in the transcendent reality. One earnestly takes it to be true in all areas of 
life with the maximum degree of confidence.
This distinguishes faith-commitments from other cases in which 
something is taken to be true without sufficient evidence, which include 
the hypothetical attitude of a  scientist, the experimental attitude of 
a modern lifestylist, and the ironic attitude of a postmodern aesthete. 
Though the scientist may be highly interested in the truth of his 
hypothesis, his interest is not usually existential. His academic career 
and the life of other people may be at stake, but not the possibility of 
life as such. Furthermore, he does not commit himself to the truth of 
his hypothesis wholeheartedly. The relevancy of his hypothesis may be 
restricted to a certain area; he may take it to be true with less than full 
commitment and he may do so without being emotionally involved at 
all. In contrast to scientific hypotheses, religious belief is – by its very 
nature  – incapable of empirical falsification, because the object of 
religious longing is transcendent.37 Someone who tries out different 
lifestyles in an experimental manner lacks the infinite interest of feeling 
as well as the decisiveness of decision which characterize the transition 
from religious longing to religious belief. The modern lifestylist may 
well be motivated by pragmatic considerations. He chooses the religion 
which makes him feel best. If the expected result does not take place he 
turns to another religion. Likewise, postmodern aesthetes maintain the 
gap between who they are and what they take to be true. Carrying out 
the leap of faith on the basis of a feeling of religious longing is to abolish 
this gap.
We can conclude that the transition from religious longing to 
religious belief is neither epistemically justified by the representational 
content of the feeling of longing nor pragmatically justified by some kind 
of value which is realised by taking to be true what one longs for (given 
that one wants to adhere to an internalist theory of justification). Rather, 
one decides to wholeheartedly take as true what one experiences in the 
feeling of longing as a condition of the possibility of (an understandable, 
37 Cf. James (1896: 334); Bishop (2007: chapter 4).
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meaningful) life. The transition from religious longing to religious belief 
is characterized by its object (the transcendent), its motive (existential 
interest) and its mode (earnestness). The feeling of religious longing 
fulfils the role of rationalizing our practical commitment to a belief which 
by its nature cannot be justified on the basis of evidence. The concept 
of passionate rationality captures the idea that under certain restricted 
conditions we are justified in taking as true what we passionately long 
to be true.38
CONCLUSION
Religious longing as a  motivation for religious faith opens up 
an  interesting perspective on theories of feelings, theories of religious 
feelings and theories of rationality. Following Roberts, we can classify 
religious longing as a  passion. We experience our current being as 
a  state of tension by which we are repulsed, and at the same time we 
anticipate the possible resolution of this tension to which we are 
attracted. Religious longing is characterized by (1) its generality, (2) its 
indeterminate transcendent object which by its nature is not capable 
of empirical verification or falsification, (3) its mode of being infinitely 
interested in passion and (4) its ambiguity with regard to our own power 
and powerlessness. Theories of feeling have to account for these kinds 
of passionate feelings. The passionate feeling of religious longing and 
the religious belief motivated by this feeling furthermore enables other 
kinds of religious feelings. If we conceive of the transition from religious 
longing to religious belief as a  paradigmatic instance of ‘passionate 
rationality’ we have a starting point for rethinking the relation between 
feelings and rationality. As emotions, they epistemically justify beliefs by 
means of their representational content. As feelings, they pragmatically 
justify beliefs by means of their hedonic character. As passions, they 
passionately justify commitments to the truth of something by means of 
expressing an existential interest.
38 These conditions of course need further specification and discussion which cannot 
be given in this article. Especially, it is of great importance to account for possible moral 
restrictions. See Bishop (2007).
152 RUTH REBECCA TIETJEN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bishop, John. 2007. Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of 
Religious Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Goldie, Peter. 2000. The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press)
Habermas, Jürgen. 2001. Glauben und Wissen: Friedenspreis des Deutschen 
Buchhandels 2001 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp)
James, William. 1896. ‘The Will to Believe’, in The New World: A  Quarterly 
Review of Religion, Ethics and Theology, V, 327–347
James, William. 2002. The Varieties of Religious Experience (Mineola, New York: 
Dover Publications)
Kant, Immanuel. 1998. Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Hamburg: Felix Meiner 
Verlag (Philosophische Bibliothek))
Kierkegaard, Søren. 1980. The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological 
Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening, ed. and transl. by Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (Kierkegaard’s 
Writings, Vol. 19))
Kierkegaard, Søren. 1987. Either/Or. Part I, ed. and transl. by Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (Kierkegaard’s 
Writings, Vol. 3))
Madell, Geoffrey. 1996. ‘What Music Teaches about Emotion’, in Philosophy, 
71 (275), 63–82
New American Standard Bible (Anaheim, California: Foundation Publications, 
1995)
Roberts, Robert C. 2003. Emotions: An  Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Roberts, Robert C. 2007. Spiritual Emotions: A Psychology of Christian Virtues 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing)
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph. 2001. Philosophische Untersuchungen über 
das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden 
Gegenstände (Hamburg: Meiner)
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 2001. Über die Religion: Reden an  die Gebildeten 
unter ihren Verächtern (Berlin: de Gruyter)
Theunissen, Michael. 1981. ‘Kierkegaard’s Negativistic Method’, in Kierkegaard’s 
Truth: The Disclosure of the Self, ed. by Joseph H. Smith (New Haven: Yale 
University Press (Psychiatry and the Humanities, Vol. 5)), 381–423
Tolstoy, Leo. 1940. A Confession, The Gospel in Brief and What I Believe, trans. by 
Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press)
Weber, Max. 1994. Briefe 1909-1910 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Gesamtausgabe, 
Abt. 2, Bd. 6))
Wynn, Mark. 2005. Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: 
Integrating Perception, Conception and Feeling (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press)
